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Harris v. State 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 47 (June 12, 2014)1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Summary
The Court determined whether a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed after the judgment
of conviction is a remedy that is “incident to the proceedings in the trial court.”
Disposition
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not “incident to the proceedings in the trial court”
when it is filed after sentencing, and is therefore not available as a separate post-conviction
remedy.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant Harris pleaded guilty to several felony offenses and was convicted on
November 16, 2011. No direct appeal was taken. Instead, on the date the judgment of
conviction was entered, Harris filed a proper person post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the district court alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied
the petition and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court on appeal.
Harris then filed a second post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus on February 29,
2012, raising similar claims to those raised in the first petition.
While the second petition was pending, on June 21, 2012, Harris filed the motion in
question here to withdraw a guilty plea. In this third motion, Harris claimed: (1) the information,
as to the forgery count, failed to set forth elements of ownership and lack of authority, making
his plea unknowing and involuntary; (2) the prosecutor failed to disclose that it was without an
accuser; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) his plea was involuntary and
unknowing. Even though this was Harris’ third post-conviction challenge to his conviction, the
district court denied the motion on the merits.
Discussion
NRS 176.165 allows a court to set aside a judgment of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw the plea to correct manifest injustice.2 In Hart v. State, the Nevada
Supreme Court construed that statute to allow for a post-conviction motion to withdraw a guilty
plea.3 Because the validity of a guilty plea may be challenged in a post-conviction petition for a
writ of habeas corpus,4 allowing the same challenge to be raised after sentencing in a separate
motion to withdraw a guilty plea goes against NRS 34.724(2)(b). That statute provides that a
post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus “[c]omprehends and takes the place of all
other common-law, statutory or other remedies which have been available for challenging the
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validity of the conviction or sentence, and must be used exclusively in place of them.”5 Two
exceptions apply to the exclusive-remedy provision: 1) an appeal from the judgment of
conviction; and 2) “any remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial court.”6 Thus,
a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea would be permitted if it were “incident to the
proceedings in the trial court.”
The Hart court addressed the question of whether a post-sentence motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is a remedy “incident to the proceedings in the trial court.” More than six years after
his conviction, Hart filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.7 Although the lower court treated
the motion as a time-barred post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Nevada
Supreme Court summarily determined that the motion was “incident to the proceedings in the
trial court.”8 To correct the problem of only post-conviction habeas petitions being subject to
time restrictions, the Hart court placed a limitation on the filing of a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea, relying on the “manifest injustice” language in NRS 176.165.9 The court explained that a
manifest injustice occurrence depends in part on “whether the State would suffer prejudice if the
defendant is permitted to withdraw his or her plea” and therefore consideration of laches is
necessary.10 The Hart court placed the burden of demonstrating that laches should not apply on
the defendant, and further indicated that laches may be applied even when the delay was less
than one year from entry of judgment of conviction.11
Here, the district court overlooked the doctrine of laches in denying the motion on the
merits, even though Harris’ motion provided no explanation as to why he should be allowed to
litigate a third post-conviction challenge to his conviction. Additionally, Hart’s analysis of
laches is confusing as usually laches is an affirmative defense against applications for postconviction relief, and Hart moved it from a defense to a filing requirement that the criminal
defendant must satisfy. This has led to an inconsistent application of Hart’s doctrine of laches,
which culminates in the need to reexamine the Hart holding that a post-sentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is “incident to the proceedings in the trial court” and not subject to the
exclusive remedy language of NRS 34.724(2)(b).
Nevada first adopted the “incident to the trial court proceedings” language and exclusiveremedy language in 1967 in the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) and created a
post-conviction petition for relief as part of NRS Chapter 177.12 The Legislature maintained this
language when it adopted the singular remedy of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in 1991,13 making it useful to examine the UPCPA and Nevada’s post-conviction history
to determine whether a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an available remedy to
challenge the validity of a guilty plea.
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Nevada post-conviction history
The Court prefaced its analysis of the issue here with a detailed discussion of Nevada’s
history of post-conviction remedies. Prior to 1967, Nevada recognized the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and allowed various motions to fill in the gaps when habeas corpus was
inadequate. In 1967, the Legislature enacted two post-conviction remedies relevant here. First,
NRS 176.165 allowed a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if filed before sentencing, while
also giving the district court power to set aside a judgment after sentencing and permit
withdrawal of a guilty plea to correct manifest injustice.14 Second, the Legislature enacted the
post-conviction procedure act.15 Lawmakers intended to “offer but one remedy” in postconviction—the writ of habeas corpus.
However, problems became apparent after the enactment. In response, the Nevada
Supreme Court declared that individuals had a choice of remedies after conviction:16 a postconviction relief petition pursuant to former NRS 117.315, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under NRS Chapter 34, and a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Then in 1991, the Legislature enacted a single post-conviction remedy was created—the
current post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to NRS 34.724.17 This
new statute included exclusivity language setting the writ of habeas corpus as the sole postconviction remedy while providing, aside from direct appeal, and also allowed remedies that are
“incident to the proceedings in the trial court.”18
Flaws in the Hart decision
The Court then reviewed its decision in Hart, finding fault with the analysis and outcome.
The Court noted that the Hart decision provided no explanation for how allowing a separate
post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea served the Legislature’s intent to create a single
post-conviction remedy or why a separate remedy was necessary when a post-conviction petition
for a writ of habeas corpus was available.19 The Court observed that a single post-conviction
remedy was imposed for the benefit of defendants themselves to reduce confusion and ensure
that constitutional claims would be heard in a timely manner. The Hart decision failed to
evaluate concerns of confusing defendants when it concluded, without analysis, that the postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea was “incident to the proceedings in the trial court.”
Defining “incident to the proceedings in the trial court”
The Court next looked to resolve problems with how it had previously defined “incident
to the proceedings in the trial court.” Earlier courts had understood the term to include challenges
that directly attack the decision of the district court itself.20 However, that definition included
claims that are more appropriately raised on direct appeal and could also implicate claims that
could be raised in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus—an outcome which is
contrary to our Legislature’s intention to adopt a single post-conviction remedy. Thus, the Court
deemed this definition inadequate and overruled that portion of Passanisi.
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As re-defined by the Court here, a motion is “incident to the proceedings in the trial
court” when it is filed prior to sentencing. This temporal definition is consistent with the
prefatory note in the UPCPA that the post-conviction remedy provides a “single, unitary, postconviction remedy to be used in place of all other state remedies (except direct review).”21 It
also keeps with the intent to create a single post-conviction remedy in Nevada. Under this
definition, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed after sentencing is not “incident to the
proceedings in the trial court.”
Habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to challenge the validity of the guilty plea after
sentencing
The Court overruled Hart, holding the exclusive post-conviction remedy is a writ of
habeas corpus. Because a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a remedy that is
“incident to the proceedings in the trial court,” the motion is subject to the exclusive-remedy
language in NRS 34.724(2)(b). That language provides that a post-conviction petition for a writ
of habeas corpus takes the place of statutory remedies previously available to challenge the
validity of a judgment of conviction. Thus, the Court overruled Hart holding a post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy for a challenge to the validity
of the guilty plea made after sentencing. The “manifest injustice” language in NRS 176.165 sets
forth the standard for reviewing a post-conviction claim challenging the validity of a guilty plea.
For future filings and currently pending post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea, the
Court instructed district court judges to construe the motion to be a post-conviction petition for a
writ of habeas corpus and require the defendant to cure any defects within a reasonable timeperiod.
Conclusion
After examining the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Nevada’s post-conviction
history, and the temporal definition of “incident to the proceedings in the trial court,” it is clear
that after sentence has been imposed, the statutory post-conviction habeas petition takes the place
of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Thus, Hart v. State is overruled and the district court’s
order denying the motion on the merits is reversed and remanded to treat the motion as a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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